

SECRET

September 1957

CONTINUED CONTROL

NOT RELEASABLE

AND MANUFACTURES RADARS FOR SYRIA (S)

A Syrian representative visited the T-1 plant in Warsaw on 29 August 1957 to accept four Nysa radar sets ordered by his Government in June 1956. Certain (unspecified) components were to be changed prior to delivery, but the four sets were ready for shipment last July. In August 1957 the plant was instructed to undertake production of 15 more tropicalized Nysas.

The Nysa is reported to be an early warning-type of radar invented by a Polish scientist in cooperation with two Polish engineers. Ten to fifteen percent of its components, including 2 trailers, are imported from the U.S.S.R. The Nysa radars produced for Syria probably are based on the model developed in June 1955. Three preceding models were Nysa A, B, and C, but the modifications involved only structural details with the original electronic design remaining unaltered. Each of the Nysa radar sets consists of five vehicles.

Because of the corrosive influence of subtropical humidity, the material used in Nysa sets produced for export to the Middle East is superior to that of the standard Polish product. Special precautions were also taken to prevent entry of grit, and cadmium powder was added to the zinc coating of metal surfaces. The trucks were painted sand green, as the Syrians requested.

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Comment: Very little is known about the Nysa radar, but it is reported to be an early warning-type radar with search-and-height-finding capabilities. The number of Nysa sets in the Polish Army is not known, but the Polish Army was reported to have ordered four sets. The T-1 plant is the "Radiowe T-1 w Budowie". These reports suggest a substantial increase in Polish radar production capabilities.

*Please return
to Arab Branch
22589*

CONTINUED CONTROL

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SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

TELETYPE INFORMATION REPORT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

TO: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, SECDEF,
NSA, OCI, OCR, ONE, ORR, OSI

CLASSIFICATION <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.2em;">SECRET</div>		DISSEMINATION CONTROLS <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 30px; margin: 0 auto;"></div> CONTINUED CONTROL	
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 30px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>		DATE DISTR. 6 NOVEMBER 1957	
COUNTRY SYRIA		PLACE ACQUIRED LEBANON, BEIRUT (2 NOVEMBER 1957)	
PRECEDENCE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE			
SUBJECT 1. RUMORED ARREST OF LT. COLONEL AKRAM DAYRI 2. STATUS OF THE TWO RADAR STATIONS AND TWO NEW ROADS.			
DATE OF INFORMATION PRIOR TO 2 NOVEMBER 1957			
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT (TENTATIVE) 3			
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 500px; height: 30px; margin: 0 auto;"></div>			
1. (UNCONFIRMED) RUMORS ARE CIRCULATING THAT LT. COLONEL AKRAM DAYRI HAS BEEN ARRESTED.			
2. THERE ARE TWO RADAR STATIONS IN NORTH SYRIA:			
A. ONE RADAR STATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED AT AL-FURLUZ, 10 KILOMETERS FROM KASSAB ON THE TURKISH FRONTIER. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: AL-FURLUZ MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH THE SOVIET BASE IN FRULLUQ, WHICH WAS REPORTED IN <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 30px; display: inline-block;"></div> FROM AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE (B).)			
B. ONE RADAR STATION IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN JABAL BANI YUNIS, NEAR THE VILLAGE OF RAS AL-SHARA.			
3. THERE ARE TWO NEW ROADS IN SYRIA:			
A. ONE ROAD FROM SILINFAH TO AL-RHAB (A FOREST IN NORTH SYRIA), WHICH IS CONNECTED TO A ROAD BETWEEN JISR AL-SHAGHUR AND MASYAF WHICH GOES TO AL-RHAB, HAS BEEN COMPLETED.			
B. A ROAD FROM FURAYI, TO CONNECT WITH A ROAD BETWEEN SILINFAH AND JAWDAT BIRGHAL, IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION.			
FIELD DISTRIBUTION: STATE, ARMY, SUBCOMNEM END OF MESSAGE			
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 30px; margin: 0 auto;"></div> CONTINUED CONTROL		CLASSIFICATION <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold; font-size: 1.2em;">SECRET</div>	

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TO: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, SECDEF,
NSA, OCT, OCR, ONE, OO/SOVMAT, ORR, DD/I

CLASSIFICATION <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> S E C R E T SECRET </div>		DISSEMINATION CONTROLS <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 20px;"></div> CONTINUED CONTROL </div>	
DATE DISTR. <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px;"></div>		24 OCTOBER 1957 PRECEDENCE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE	
COUNTRY SYRIA/USSR		PLACE ACQUIRED JORDAN, AMMAN (18 OCTOBER 1957)	
SUBJECT ACTIVITIES AT THE SOVIET BASE IN FRULLUQ			
DATE OF INFORMATION APPROXIMATELY 15 OCTOBER 1957		<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 50px; margin: 0 auto;"></div> <div style="position: relative; width: 100%; height: 100%;"> file Syria - An </div>	
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT (TENTATIVE) 3			

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1. AS OF APPROXIMATELY 15 OCTOBER 1957, THE SOVIET BASE AT FRULLUQ, SYRIA, (LOCATED IN A WOODED AREA, WHICH HIDES IT FROM THE ROAD, ABOUT 30 KILOMETERS FROM THE SYRIAN-TURKISH BORDER ON THE ALEPPO-LATAKIA ROAD) WAS EQUIPPED WITH THE FOLLOWING:

A. ONE RADAR STATION.

B. ONE "BIG" RADIO RECEIVER WHICH, AS OF 15 OCTOBER, HAS BEEN OPERATING ON A 24-HOUR BASIS FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS. (INFORMANT COMMENT: NO RADIO TRANSMITTER IS KNOWN TO EXIST AT THE BASE; IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE RADIO RECEIVER IS USED TO RECEIVE REPORTS FROM COMMUNIST AGENTS INSIDE TURKEY OR AS A RELAY STATION BETWEEN MOSCOW AND THE MIDDLE EAST AREA.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT:

DATED 26 SEPTEMBER 1957, FROM THE SAME SOURCE AS THIS REPORT, FOR SOVIET SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN AT THIS BASE.)

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2. FIVE ARAB RADIO AND ELECTRICAL TECHNICIANS WERE AT THE BASE TO ASSIST THE SOVIETS.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE

END OF MESSAGE

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 20px;"></div> CONTINUED CONTROL </div>		CLASSIFICATION <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> S E C R E T SECRET </div>	
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

TELETYPED INFORMATION REPORT

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TO: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, JCS, SECDEF, ~~OSI~~
NSA, ONE, OCI, OCR, *OSI*

CLASSIFICATION <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">S E C R E T</div>		DISSEMINATION CONTROLS <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div> CONTINUED CONTROL		25X1
OUT - DATE - TIME - GROUP 20 MARCH 1957		PRECEDENCE <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 20px; height: 15px; display: inline-block;"></div> ROUTINE		25X1
COUNTRY SYRIA/USSR/CZECHOSLOVAKIA		PLACE ACQUIRED LEBANON, BEIRUT (13 MARCH 1957)		
SUBJECT SOVIET BLOC MILITARY AFFAIRS IN SYRIA		<i>an</i> <i>Ed</i>		
DATE OF INFORMATION PRIOR TO 13 MARCH 1957				25X1
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT (TENTATIVE) 3				
<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 30px; margin-bottom: 10px;"></div> <p>1. CZECH TECHNICIANS ARE CONSTRUCTING A <u>RADAR STATION IN NORTH SYRIA</u>. THE FACILITY WAS PRESENTED AS A GIFT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA.</p> <p>2. <u>SOVIETS ARE TRAINING EGYPTIAN PILOTS IN SYRIA</u>. (FIELD COMMENT: PRESUMABLY FOR JET PLANES.)</p> <p>FIELD DISTRIBUTION: SUBCOMTELM</p> <p style="text-align: center; margin-top: 20px;">END OF MESSAGE</p>				
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div> CONTINUED CONTROL		CLASSIFICATION <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">S E C R E T</div>		25X1

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SECRET**MESSAGE**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, [REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET
ROUTINEAC PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
Except prior to Category B encryption
Physically remove all internal refs
by DTG prior to declassification
No unclass ref if DTG is quoted

(AR)

FROM: USARMA DAMASCUS SYRIA

TO : CNO WASH DC, DEPTAR WASH DC, CSUSAF WASH DC

MIL

INFO: CINCELM LONDON ENGLAND, COMSIXTHFLT, FICELM PT
LYAUTEY MOROCCO, ALUSNA ANKARA TURKEY, ALUSNA ATHENS GREECE,
ALUSNA BAGHDAD IRAQ, ALUSNA CAIRO EGYPT,
ALUSNA TEHRAN IRAN

EEY

NR CX 351

291109Z NOV 57

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CNO FOR ONI, DA FOR ACSI, CSUSAF FOR AFCIN. SGO
SAMUELL ACTING.

This is a joint ARMA Damascus-ALUSNA Beirut msg:

Greek Mil Attache Damascus (source) in company
Yugoslav Mil Attache visited Latakia and Minet El Beida 19-21
Nov. Syrian Navy present Latakia 2 SC, 5 MTB, 4 MB, 3 LCT.
None present Minet El Beida.Minet El Beida: Breakwater estimated 450 meters
long very near completion with Eastern side fitted to moor
vessels. From shore end breakwater approximately 250 meters
quai extends to Eastward also fitted to moor vessels. From
end quasi a slip extends approximately 125 meters to South.
Marine railway which ALUSNA believes located south end this
slip not observed (source unfamiliar this type installation
but he observed two boats under repair this vicinity).Source states Yugoslav port construction engineer
from Latakia (whose company also employed construct breakwater
Minet El Beida) told him harbor dredged to depth of from 12 to
18 meters, dredged area being to Eastward of breakwater and to
Northward of slip with a turning area of estimated 250 meters
diameter provided.

DA IN 75075

(30 NOV 57)

24

SECRETREPRODUCTION
PROHIBITED

800 FORM

35-3

REPLACES 800 FORM
1741 AUG 57 WHICH
LIV IN USE

30 Nov 57

SECRET**MESSAGE**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

NR CX 351

PAGE 2

Two single barrel 3" MM AA gun emplacements observed, one at land end of breakwater and other at eastward continuation of quay wall on opposite side of slip.

Buildings noted as follows: Near end breakwater one with tower which could be signal stations; to South of end breakwater a possible admin bldg; to Southeast of slip a large hangar type structure under construction; to Eastward of hangar three smaller structures under construction, believed barracks with estimated capacity 800 maximum. No identifiable power plant or above-surface oil storages observed. Bulgarian firm doing construction.

[REDACTED] Comdr Syrian Navy told source

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(A) Navy expects transfer ships and sailors to new base next spring.

(B) Navy has no submarines.

(C) Has only 7 MTB, two being under repair in Egypt.

(D) Syrian Navy pers being trained in Egypt.

Source confirms presence two probable Whiff Radars mounted on hills overlooking Latakia Harbor reported ALUSNA Beirut msg 211110Z but locates first radar on hill approximately lat 353207 long 354651. Source did not observe guns reported in above msg.

Eval B source, info based on source observation probably true; info received from subsources eval F-6.

ALUSNA comment: It improbable that dredging to depth greater than 10 meters has been done. Previously furnished air photos believed confirm existence and location marine railways.

NOTE : 211112Z 18 DA IN 72898 (22 Nov 57) ACS1

ACTION: ACS1

INFO : DCSOP, JCS, OSD, OSA, CONARC LN, ACS1 (STATE, CIA), CMC

DA IN 75075

(30 Nov 57)

mcg/7

SCD FORM 35-3
1 JUN 58

REPLACES OCS FORM 35-3 1 AUG 58 WHICH MAY BE USED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION
PROHIBITED